精神のモジュール形式

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The Modularity of Mind (English Edition)

1983/4/6
Jerry A. Fodor

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精神のモジュール形式―人工知能と心の哲学 (1985年) － – 古書, 1985/3

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Modularity of mind

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Modularity of mind is the notion that a mind may, at least in part, be composed of innate neural structures or modules which have distinct established evolutionarily developed functions. Somewhat different definitions of "module" have been proposed by different authors.

 

 
 

 

Early investigations

Historically, questions regarding the functional architecture of the mind have been divided into two different theories of the nature of the faculties. The first can be characterized as a horizontal view because it refers to mental processes as if they are interactions between faculties such as memory, imagination, judgement, and perception, which are not domain specific (e. g., a judgement remains a judgement whether it refers to a perceptual experience or to the conceptualization/comprehension process). The second can be characterized as a vertical view because it claims that the mental faculties are differentiated on the basis of domain specificity, are genetically determined, are associated with distinct neurological structures, and are computationally autonomous.

The vertical vision goes back to the 19th century movement called phrenology and its founder Franz Joseph Gall, who claimed that the individual mental faculties could be associated precisely, in a sort of one to one correspondence, with specific physical areas of the brain. Hence, someone's level of intelligence, for example, could be literally "read off" from the size of a particular bump on his posterior parietal lobe. This simplistic view of modularity has been disproven over the course of the last century.

Fodor's Modularity of Mind

In the 1980s, however, Jerry Fodor revived the idea of the modularity of mind, although without the notion of precise physical localizability. Drawing from Noam Chomsky's idea of the language acquisition device and other work in linguistics as well as from the philosophy of mind and the implications of optical illusions, he became a major proponent of the idea with the 1983 publication of Modularity of Mind.[1]

According to Fodor, a module falls somewhere between the behaviorist and cognitivist views of lower-level processes.

Behaviorists tried to replace the mind with reflexes which Fodor describes as encapsulated (cognitively impenetrable or unaffected by other cognitive domains) and non-inferential (straight pathways with no information added). Low level processes are unlike reflexes in that they are inferential. This can be demonstrated by poverty of the stimulus arguments in which the proximate stimulus, that which is initially received by the brain (such as the 2D image received by the retina), cannot account for the resulting output (for example, our 3D perception of the world), thus necessitating some form of computation.

In contrast, cognitivists saw lower level processes as continuous with higher level processes, being inferential and cognitively penetrable (influenced by other cognitive domains, such as beliefs). The latter has been shown to be untrue in some cases, such as with many visual illusions (ex. Müller-Lyer illusion), which can persist despite a person's awareness of their existence. This is taken to indicate that other domains, including one's beliefs, cannot influence such processes.

Fodor arrives at the conclusion that such processes are inferential like higher order processes and encapsulated in the same sense as reflexes.

Although he argued for the modularity of "lower level" cognitive processes in Modularity of Mind he also argued that higher level cognitive processes are not modular since they have dissimilar properties. The Mind Doesn't Work That Way, a reaction to Steven Pinker's How the Mind Works, is devoted to this subject.

Fodor (1983) states that modular systems must—at least to "some interesting extent"—fulfill certain properties:

  1. Domain specificity: modules only operate on certain kinds of inputs—they are specialised
  2. Informational encapsulation: modules need not refer to other psychological systems in order to operate
  3. Obligatory firing: modules process in a mandatory manner
  4. Fast speed: probably due to the fact that they are encapsulated (thereby needing only to consult a restricted database) and mandatory (time need not be wasted in determining whether or not to process incoming input)
  5. Shallow outputs: the output of modules is very simple
  6. Limited accessibility
  7. Characteristic ontogeny: there is a regularity of development
  8. Fixed neural architecture.

Pylyshyn (1999) has argued that while these properties tend to occur with modules, one—information encapsulation—stands out as being the real signature of a module; that is the encapsulation of the processes inside the module from both cognitive influence and from cognitive access.[2] One example is that conscious awareness of the Müller-Lyer illusion being an illusion does not correct visual processing.[3]

Evolutionary psychology and massive modularity

Other perspectives on modularity come from evolutionary psychology, particularly from the work of Leda Cosmides and John Tooby. This perspective suggests that modules are units of mental processing that evolved in response to selection pressures. On this view, much modern human psychological activity is rooted in adaptations that occurred earlier in human evolution, when natural selection was forming the modern human species.

Evolutionary psychologists propose that the mind is made up of genetically influenced and domain-specific[4] mental algorithms or computational modules, designed to solve specific evolutionary problems of the past.[5] Cosmides and Tooby also state in a brief "primer" on their website,[6] that "…the brain is a physical system. It functions like a computer," "…the brain’s function is to process information," "different neural circuits are specialized for solving different adaptive problems," and "our modern skulls house a stone age mind."

The definition of module has caused confusion and dispute. J. A. Fodor initially defined module as "functionally specialized cognitive systems" that have nine features but not necessarily all at the same time. In his views modules can be found in peripheral processing such as low-level visual processing but not in central processing. Later he narrowed the two essential features to domain-specificity and information encapsulation. Frankenhuis and Ploeger[3] write that domain-specificity means that "a given cognitive mechanism accepts, or is specialized to operate on, only a specific class of information". Information encapsulation means that information processing in the module cannot be affected by information in the rest of the brain. One example is that being aware that a certain optical illusion, caused by low level processing, is false does not prevent the illusion from persisting.[3]

Evolutionary psychologists instead usually define modules as functionally specialized cognitive systems that are domain-specific and may also contain innate knowledge about the class of information processed. Modules can be found also for central processing. This theory is sometimes referred to as massive modularity.[3]

A 2010 review by evolutionary psychologists Confer et al. suggested that domain general theories, such as for "rationality," has several problems: 1. Evolutionary theories using the idea of numerous domain-specific adaptions have produced testable predictions that have been empirically confirmed; the theory of domain-general rational thought has produced no such predictions or confirmations. 2. The rapidity of responses such as jealousy due to infidelity indicates a domain-specific dedicated module rather than a general, deliberate, rational calculation of consequences. 3. Reactions may occur instinctively (consistent with innate knowledge) even if a person have not learned such knowledge. One example being that in the ancestral environment it is unlikely that males during development learn that infidelity (usually secret) may cause paternal uncertainty (from observing the phenotypes of children born many months later and making a statistical conclusion from the phenotype dissimilarity to the cuckolded fathers).[7] With respect to general purpose problem solvers, Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby (1992) have suggested in The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and The Generation of Culture that a purely general problem solving mechanism is impossible to build due to the frame problem. Clune et al. (2013) have argued that computer simulations of the evolution of neural nets suggest that modularity evolves because, compared to non-modular networks, connection costs are lower.[8]

Several groups of critics, including psychologists working within evolutionary frameworks,[9] argue that the massively modular theory of mind does little to explain adaptive psychological traits. Proponents of other models of the mind argue that the computational theory of mind is no better at explaining human behavior than a theory with mind entirely a product of the environment. Even within evolutionary psychology there is discussion about the degree of modularity, either as a few generalist modules or as many highly specific modules.[9][10] Other critics suggest that there is little empirical support in favor of the domain-specific theory beyond performance on the Wason selection task, a task critics state is too limited in scope to test all relevant aspects of reasoning.[11][12] Moreover, critics argue that Cosmides and Tooby's conclusions contain several inferential errors and that the authors use untested evolutionary assumptions to eliminate rival reasoning theories.[11][13]

Wallace (2010) observes that the evolutionary psychologists' definition of "mind" have been heavily influenced by cognitivism and/or information processing definitions of the mind.[14] Critics point out that these assumptions underlying evolutionary psychologists' hypotheses are controversial and have been contested by some psychologists, philosophers, and neuroscientists. For example, Jaak Panksepp, an affective neuroscientist, point to the "remarkable degree of neocortical plasticity within the human brain, especially during development" and states that "the developmental interactions among ancient special-purpose circuits and more recent general-purpose brain mechanisms can generate many of the "modularized" human abilities that evolutionary psychology has entertained."[9]

Philosopher David Buller agrees with the general argument that the human mind has evolved over time but disagrees with the specific claims evolutionary psychologists make. He has argued that the contention that the mind consists of thousands of modules, including sexually dimorphic jealousy and parental investment modules, are unsupported by the available empirical evidence.[15] He has suggested that the "modules" result from the brain's developmental plasticity and that they are adaptive responses to local conditions, not past evolutionary environments.[16] However, Buller has also stated that even if massive modularity is false this does not necessarily have broad implications for evolutionary psychology. Evolution may create innate motives even without innate knowledge.[17]

In contrast to modular mental structure, some theories posit domain-general processing, in which mental activity is distributed across the brain and cannot be decomposed, even abstractly, into independent units. A staunch defender of this view is William Uttal, who argues in The New Phrenology (2003) that there are serious philosophical, theoretical, and methodological problems with the entire enterprise of trying to localise cognitive processes in the brain.[18] Part of this argument is that a successful taxonomy of mental processes has yet to be developed.

Merlin Donald argues that over evolutionary time the mind has gained adaptive advantage from being a general problem solver.[19] The mind, as described by Donald, includes module-like "central" mechanisms, in addition to more recently evolved "domain-general" mechanisms.

See also

References

 

 

  1. Donald, A Mind So Rare: The Evolution of Human Consciousness [1].

Further reading

  • Barrett, H.C., and Kurzban, R. (2006). Modularity in cognition: Framing the debate. Psychological Review, 113, 628-647. Full text
  • Pylyshyn, Z.W. (1984). Computation and cognition: Toward a foundation for cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (Also available through CogNet).
  • Animal Minds: Beyond Cognition to Consciousness Donald R. Griffin, University of Chicago Press, 2001 (ISBN 0226308650)
  • Shallice, Tim, & Cooper, Rick. (2011). The Organisation of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 3: Bridging the Theoretical Gap: from the Brain to Cognitive Theory (pp. 67–107).

Online videos

 

心のモジュール性

 

心のモジュール性（こころのもじゅーるせい、英：Modularity of mind）とは、心が特定の機能を果たすために個別の生得的な構造を基盤に持ち、それぞれが進化的に発達したという概念を指す。この概念の支持者はノーム・チョムスキーの普遍文法、生成文法が最初にこの概念を示唆したと考えている。チョムスキーの言語に関する解明は、言語が脳の中の「言語獲得装置」に由来することを示唆している。この装置は自律的で言語の急速な学習に専門化された「モジュール」であると仮定された。

 

目次

 

フォーダーのモジュール

歴史的に、心の機能構造に関する疑問は、機能の性質に関する二つの異なる理論に分けられた。一つは水平的な視点と表現することができる。精神的なプロセスは例えば記憶、想像力、判断と認識のような機能同士の相互作用であるかのように言及する。それは領域特異的ではない。二つ目は垂直的な視点と表現できる。精神的な機能は領域特異性に基づいて区別でき、遺伝決定的であり、明確に神経学的構造と連動している。そしてそれは計算機的で自律的である。

垂直的な視点は骨相学とその創設者フランツ・ヨーゼフ・ガルの19世紀の運動に遡る。ガルは個々の精神的な機能が脳の物理的な領域に一対一で正確に関連づけられると主張した。それゆえ、人の知性のレベルは例えば下側頭葉の大きさから文字通り読み取ることができる。このモジュール性の単純すぎる視点はもちろん、前世紀に否定された。

しかしながら、ジェリー・フォーダーはチョムスキーと他の言語学的な証拠、そして錯視、心の理論な どの知見から精神的な機能と身体的な部位を関連づけることなく、心のモジュール性というアイディアを甦らせた。フォーダーは1983年に 『Modularity of Mind』（邦訳『精神のモジュール形式』1985年）を出版し、このアイディアの明確な支持者の一人となった。フォーダーによればモジュール説は行動主義と、認知主義の下位レベルプロセスに対する見解の間のどこかに収まる。

行動主義者は「心」をフォーダーがカプセル化（認知領域が他の認知領域の影響を受けないか、鈍感化）されており非推論的（non-inferential:他の情報を加えられることが無く直線的な経路で伝えられる）であると描写した「反射」と置き換えようと試みた。下位レベルプロセスはそれが推論的であるという点で反射とは異なる。これは「刺激の貧困」で説明することができる。例えば、直接的な刺激（例えば網膜に投影された二次元のイメージ）はまず脳によって受け取られるが、それだけでは結果として生じる出力（三次元的な世界の認識）を説明できない。

対照的に、認知主義者は低レベルのプロセスをより高次のプロセスと連続的であると考える。それは認知的に侵入されやすく、（例えば信念や思考のような）他の認知領域の影響を受ける。しかしそれは下位レベルのプロセスについて正しくない。例えばミュラー・リヤー錯視を考える場合、人は錯視の存在を認識しているにもかかわらず、錯視は維持される。これは他の領域（例えば信念や思考）が特定の認識プロセスに影響できないことを示す。

フォーダーはそのようなプロセスが高次レベルのプロセスと同じように推論的で、反射のような感覚と同じようにカプセル化されているという結論に達する。

彼は下位レベルの認識プロセスのモジュール性を提唱したが、同時に高位レベルの認識プロセス（例えば創造性などを司る）はそれ独自の特性があり、モジュール的ではないと主張した。スティーブン・ピンカーの『心はどのように働くか？』（邦題:心の仕組み）はフォーダーの主張を拡張した。しかしフォーダーはピンカーの視点が楽観的すぎると批判した。フォーダーの『心はそのようには働かない（The Mind Doesn't Work That Way）[1]』はピンカーの著作に対する返答であり、ピンカーはさらに『それならどのように働くのか？（So How Does the Mind Work?）』[2]と反論した。

特徴

フォーダーはモジュールシステムが以下の特性を（少なくとも興味深い範囲で）満たすはずだと述べた。

  1. 領域特異性。モジュールは特定のインプットにだけ反応する。それらは特殊化されている。
  2. 情報のカプセル化。モジュールが働くために他の精神的なシステムを参照する必要はない。
  3. 強制的な発火。モジュールプロセスは強制的な形で作動する。
  4. 即座の作動。恐らくカプセル化によって、限られたデータベースを参照するだけでよい。
  5. 浅い出力。モジュールの出力は非常に単純である。
  6. 限定されたアクセス可能性（いつ何時でも作動するわけではない）。
  7. 特徴のある個体発生と、規則的な発達。
  8. 洗練された神経構造。

ゼノン・ピリシンはこれらの特性がモジュールによって起きる傾向があると同時に、モジュールの実在の兆候として目立つと主張した。モジュール内のプロセスは認知的影響と意識的なアクセスから独立してカプセル化されている。これはモジュールの「認知的影響の不可能性」と呼ばれる。

モジュールがどの程度細分化されているか、個々のモジュール同士の相互作用のレベル、一般知能と専門化されたモジュールの関係などは意見が分かれる。進化心理学者レダ・コスミデスとジョン・トゥービーはより強いモジュール論者であり、様々な多数のモジュール（例えば顔認識、血縁認識、恐怖、協力行動、裏切りや不正の検出、道具使用）を想定している。人類学者ダン・スペルベルは基本的ないくつかのモジュールの上にメタ表象モジュール（MMR）があると仮定しているが、これはフォーダーの視点に近い。

進化心理学

モジュール性について他の視点は進化心理学、特にコスミデスとトゥービーの研究からもたらされる。この視点はモジュールが自然選択の選択圧によって進化した精神活動の単位であると主張する。この視点では、現代的な行動の多くは人類の進化の初期に起きた、ホモ・サピエンス・サピエンスを形作った自然選択に由来している。

議論

心のモジュール構造理論とは対照的に、いくつかの理論は領域一般的な脳構造説を仮定する。その視点では精神的な働きは脳全体に分布しており、独立した部分に分解することはできないと主張する。この議論の一部は精神プロセスの分類がまだ十分に発展していないことに由来する。

関連文献

英語

  • Fodor, Jerry A. (1983). Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-56025-9 Full text
  • Barrett, H. C., and Kurzban, R. (2006). Modularity in cognition: Framing the debate. Psychological Review, 113, 628-647. Full text
  • Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1984). Computation and cognition: Toward a foundation for cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (ISBN 0-262-16098-6 Also available through CogNet).
  • Animal Minds : Beyond Cognition to Consciousness Donald R. Griffin, University of Chicago Press, 2001 (ISBN 0226308650)

脚注

  1. ^ The Mind Doesn't Work That Way http://cogweb.ucla.edu/Abstracts/Fodor_00.html
  2. ^ So How Does the Mind Work? http://pinker.wjh.harvard.edu/articles/papers/So_How_Does_The_Mind_Work.pdf

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