フッサールの「プロレゴメナ」における命題の存在論(GENKI　UEMURA)

PoPuPS | Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique

 

Bulletin d’analyse phénoménologique VI 9, 2010
The Ontology of Propositions in Husserl’s　Prolegomena
By GENKI　UEMURA
Centre for Advanced Study on Logic and
Sensibility, Keio University (Tokyo)
Abstract
The aim of the present paper is to reformulate the ontology of　propositions which Husserl proposes in his
Prolegomena zur reinen Logik　(1900). In this book Husserl claims that propositions, with which what he
calls “pure logic” has to do, are properties (“species”) of acts of, say, judging. Furthermore, he regards properties as circumscribing the range of all　their possible instances. Given these　ideas, it becomes clear how Husserl’s
discussion on the nature of logic depends on his ontology of proposition. In　the present paper, the following two points
are discussed for that claim. First,　the whole structure of his negative argument against psychologism can be
correctly understood only if Husserl’s ontology of proposition is taken into
consideration. This explains the reason why Husserl does not content himself　with the conception of logic as an
a priori　normative science to refute　psychologism. Second, his positive view on logical laws would also be made
more intelligible by that theory. His theory provides what is needed for the
refutation of psychologism without abandoning a largely Aristotelian view
on logic, which Husserl regards as indispensable, but which would be very
difficult to save if one adopts only the　a priori　normative conception.