フッサールの「プロレゴメナ」における命題の存在論(GENKI UEMURA)
PoPuPS | Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique
Bulletin d’analyse phénoménologique VI 9, 2010
ISSN 1782-2041 http://popups.ulg.ac.be/bap.htm
The Ontology of Propositions in Husserl’s Prolegomena
By GENKI UEMURA
Centre for Advanced Study on Logic and
Sensibility, Keio University (Tokyo)
Abstract
The aim of the present paper is to reformulate the ontology of propositions which Husserl proposes in his
Prolegomena zur reinen Logik (1900). In this book Husserl claims that propositions, with which what he
calls “pure logic” has to do, are properties (“species”) of acts of, say, judging. Furthermore, he regards properties as circumscribing the range of all their possible instances. Given these ideas, it becomes clear how Husserl’s
discussion on the nature of logic depends on his ontology of proposition. In the present paper, the following two points
are discussed for that claim. First, the whole structure of his negative argument against psychologism can be
correctly understood only if Husserl’s ontology of proposition is taken into
consideration. This explains the reason why Husserl does not content himself with the conception of logic as an
a priori normative science to refute psychologism. Second, his positive view on logical laws would also be made
more intelligible by that theory. His theory provides what is needed for the
refutation of psychologism without abandoning a largely Aristotelian view
on logic, which Husserl regards as indispensable, but which would be very
difficult to save if one adopts only the a priori normative conception.